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1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become a crucial driver of economic integration
since the sales by foreign affiliates have outnumbered exports two decades ago. There
is a considerably large literature devoted to the explanation of the existence of multina-
tional firms and FDI. Starting with the knowledge-capital model by Markusen (1984),
it has been shown that it is advantageous to operate multinational firms when firm-level
scale economies, generated mostly by R&D, are large, and plant-level scale economies
are small (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; and Markusen and Venables, 1998; 2000).
Statistical evidence shows that multinationals intensively use professional and techni-
cal workers, and are well represented in capital-intensive and R&D-intensive industries;
see, for instance, Antràs and Yeaple (2013) for U.S. multinationals, Mayer and Otta-
viano (2008) for French, German, Norwegian and Belgian multinationals, and Navaretti
and Venables (2004) for French, German, Japanese, British and U.S. multinationals.
Multinationals’ large R&D investments and intensive use of professional and technical
workers generate proprietary knowledge (patents, blueprints, technical know-how, or
reputation), and are considered as an important source of firm heterogeneity.1 Helpman
et al. (2004), extending Melitz’s (2003) heterogeneous firm model, show that FDI sales
relative to exports are larger in industries with a more dispersed sales distribution,
and that there is clear sorting by productivity: the most productive firms become
multinational, whereas less productive firms export, and the least productive firms
serve only local markets.2 This type of sorting is, by and large, supported by the
1Unlike R&D intensive industries, there seems to be little scope for firm heterogeneity in firms’ tech-
nical know-how in advertising-intensive industries (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007).
2Also more productive firms in high R&D industries seem to prefer greenfield investment to a merger,
or to a joint venture (Raff et al., 2012; and Nocke and Yeaple, 2007). In theory, such types of sorting
holds insofar as the profit function is supermodular in marginal costs (Mrázová and Neary, 2013).
Moreover, since markets for knowledge are imperfect, firms decide to keep capital-intensive (research)
activities within firm boundaries as is shown in a general equilibrium model by Antràs (2003).
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results that emerge from the empirical literature on firm heterogeneity.3
Both the knowledge-capital and the heterogeneous firm models assume complete in-
formation. The R&D outcome is, however, typically subject to uncertainty, and so a
high level of R&D activities of the multinationals lends some support to the hypothesis
that firm productivity is not known by rival firms. What happens if the productivity
of a firm is not known to rival firms? Suppose that the most productive firms under-
take FDI, as in Helpman et al. (2004). If a local firm observes the establishment of
a foreign subsidiary, and firms’ marginal production costs are private information, we
would expect that this firm would come to the conclusion that it now faces a strong
rival. In markets where firms are potentially large, and thus an industry is potentially
concentrated, the observation of an investment by a foreign firm will have an effect on
domestic firm behavior.4 It is this effect we are interested in: what happens if FDI
sends a message of high productivity in an environment of firm heterogeneity?
We explore this by comparing the case where FDI is a signal with a case that FDI cannot
be observed before strategic market decisions are made.5 We show that, for a given fixed
FDI cost, both the probability of FDI and the expected industry output are greater
as compared with the benchmark case where firms must make their output decisions
before knowing the entry mode of their rivals. That is, we find another important
factor that contributes to the preponderance of FDI when firms are heterogeneous. In
our model, as in the literature on international trade with heterogeneous costs, firms
3See, among others, Antràs and Yeaple (2013), Castellani and Giovannetti (2010), Arnold and
Hussinger (2010), Aw and Lee (2008), Mayer and Ottaviano (2008), Castellani and Zanfei (2007),
Tomiura (2007), Kimura and Kiyota (2006), Wagner (2006), and Girma et al. (2005; 2004).
4In concentrated (high R&D) industries, firms generally have incomplete information about the costs
of their foreign rivals (Collie and Hviid, 1993). A typical example is the micro-electronics industry
where R&D investments/experience and some idiosyncratic factors determine firms’ production costs.
Incomplete operating cost information is also prevalent in the airline industry (Vives, 2002).
5The latter case is merely a theoretical benchmark so as to isolate the signaling effect of FDI, while
keeping the same underlying incomplete information structure of the model. In general, FDI projects
do not remain secret for long, and a substantial portion of strategic interactions presumably occurs
after the actual FDI takes place.
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self-select into different entry modes. We find that the range of fixed FDI costs within
which weak firms will choose exporting and strong firms will choose FDI is larger
when signaling is possible. Furthermore, the threshold level of fixed FDI costs below
which all types of firms will choose FDI in preference to exporting is higher under the
signaling case. This result reinforces our finding that the signaling environment is more
conducive to FDI.
The main contribution of this paper is to scrutinize both the strategic (signaling)
effects of FDI and sorting by productivity in an environment of firm heterogeneity and
incomplete cost information. Although empirical evidence suggests that information
asymmetries crucially affect firms’ cross-border investment strategies (e.g., see Lópes
Duarte and García-Canal, 2004; García-Canal et al., 2002; and Shen and Reuer, 2005),
only a few papers have explored the strategic effects of FDI in a setting of incomplete
information. Long et al. (2011) consider a model with imperfect knowledge about
rivals’ production costs, but FDI is ruled out, as they focus on export behavior and
the role of R&D when production costs are private information. In Katayama and
Miyagiwa (2009), product quality is unknown and FDI is used to signal quality to
consumers, whereas in Nastasi and Reverberi (2007), a firm uses FDI as a signaling
device to deter market entry. In a model of asymmetric demand information, Moner-
Colonques et al. (2007) show that firms may have an additional incentive to undertake
FDI, so as to obtain more accurate demand information. There is, however, no study
that takes on board both sorting and the signaling effects of FDI.
Similarly, in Bagwell and Staiger (2003), a firm’s location choice for production sends
some information to rivals, while sorting by productivity (firm heterogeneity) is ruled
out. They focus on a single firm’s foreign market entry decision, and confine their
analysis to the existence of multinationals. They show that if there is firm-specific
asymmetric information on the productivity parameter, then a high productivity firm
will locate production where wages (partly production costs) are higher so as to signal
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high productivity.6 If, however, there is country-specific asymmetric information, then
their model is set up such that producing in the domestic country (exporting) generates
incomplete cost information (due to privately known domestic factor prices), whereas
locating production in the foreign country (FDI) leads to competition under complete
information. In the country-specific case, it is evident that the firm would never opt
for FDI, had there been no asymmetric information.7 They show that there is no
sufficient signaling effect such that the existence of multinationals in equilibrium can
only be explained (just for some parameter values) by the existence of plant-specific
fixed FDI costs and by some transport costs of exporting. In our study, the existence of
multinationals is the same as in the knowledge-capital models (consistent with empirical
regularities), and the source of incomplete information is firm-specific and does not
rely on factor price differences across countries. We look at both the strategic effects
of FDI and sorting by productivity and demonstrate the clear effects of signaling, not
only on the incentives for FDI, but also on sorting by productivity. The model’s setup
is consistent with the important strands of the literature (i.e., the knowledge-capital
models and the heterogeneous firm models) and the predictions of the model are novel
and of significant interest, both theoretically and policy wise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
considers the benchmark case of FDI under incomplete information, without signaling
possibilities. Section 3 extends the model to the case where a firm’s FDI decision
signals its marginal cost. Section 4 compares the two cases to show how signaling
affects the probability of FDI and the expected industry output. Section 5 concludes
the paper. For convenience, we have relegated the exposition of some computations to
the Appendix.
6We cannot rule out the fact that the domestic country has higher factor prices, in which case their
model suggests that only less productive firms would multinationalize, contradicting the evidence
that is demonstrated by a vast number of studies (see e.g., footnote 3).
7The existence of multinationals is tied to the existence of incomplete information.
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2 FDI under incomplete cost information: the non-
signaling case
Our model consists of two countries and two firms. Each firm has its headquarters in its
own country. Market entry warrants a firm to carry a fixed cost to be technologically
capable to produce in this industry, and we assume that the size of this fixed cost is
such that only one firm will have entered in each country. Since both firms have to
carry these fixed costs irrespective of the foreign entry mode, they do not play any role
in determining the foreign entry mode. The firm that is based in country i, denoted
firm i, competes against the firm that is based in country j, denoted firm j, in both
markets i and j, i 6= j. Since FDI is capacity-building and thus a lasting commitment,
we develop a model in which firms compete by quantities or capacities.8
Furthermore, as multinational firms are more productive on average, we choose a setup
in which firms have a genuine interest to be of high productivity, and this is the reason
why we employ the simplest model of strategic substitutes in the sense of Bulow et al.
(1985). Thus, our model encompasses the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and
Krugman (1983), and the reciprocal FDI model of De Santis and Stähler (2004), and
adds two features: marginal production costs are private information, and FDI may
serve as a signal. We defer, however, the signaling aspect of FDI until Section 4. In our
model, marginal production costs, denoted c, are private information. After entry, firms
draw their costs from the uniform density distribution, with cumulative distribution
function Φ(c) = (c − α)/(β − α), where β and α are the upper and lower bounds,
respectively. Thus, our model features both firm heterogeneity and the strategic aspect
of private cost information.9
8In a setting of complete cost information, the Cournot model is well-known to be strategically equiv-
alent to a two-stage capacity-price game (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983).
9While the former is similar to Helpman et al. (2004), the latter is usually assumed away in the
heterogeneous firm literature.
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We denote by qdi and q
f
i the quantities that firm i supplies to its own country’s market
and to the foreign market (either by exporting or by FDI). Therefore the total quantity
supplied in country i’s market is Qi = qdi + q
f
j . We keep the demand side of the model
as simple as possible, and assume that in each country the inverse demand function is
given by pk = A−Qk, (k = i, j), as we assume that the two markets are segmented.10
The trade-off between serving a foreign market via exports or via FDI is as follows. If
a firm decides for exports, there is a per-unit trade cost, denoted t, that the exporting
firm has to cover; if a firm decides for FDI and becomes a multinational, it saves on
trade costs, although FDI requires additional fixed investment costs, denoted by F .
In this respect, we follow the standard literature, featuring the well-known proximity-
concentration trade-off.11 Both the per-unit trade cost and fixed investment costs are
common knowledge. For the ease of exposition, we may focus only on fixed FDI costs;
an alternative interpretation would be that this is the difference between aggregate
fixed costs of FDI and fixed costs of R&D.
We are now ready to scrutinize the behavior of these two firms and the scope for
FDI under incomplete information. We first consider a one-stage game in which FDI
cannot serve as a signal: both firms decide on exporting versus FDI at the same
time as they decide on their outputs/capacities for both the domestic and the foreign
market. This is, then, a one-stage Bayesian game: when deciding on output levels,
firms do not know each other’s mode of supply to foreign markets, which is either by
exporting or via FDI, nor do they know each other’s marginal production costs. In
any case, each firm maximizes its expected profits and forms expectations on its rival’s
10Under complete information and symmetry, the assumption of segmented markets is innocuous
because equilibrium prices are identical, so there is no reason for arbitrage. In our model, ex-ante
symmetry does not imply ex post identical prices. If we allowed for arbitrage, we would have to
take into account the probability that prices in the two markets differ by more than trade costs.
11In this respect, the model is very much in the style of Horstmann and Markusen (1992). The
difference is that the two firms in our model can have different (constant) marginal costs, and so
asymmetric equilibria in terms of the two firms’ foreign market entry mode choices are possible. In
Horstmann and Markusen (1992), however, such equilibria can only occur if firms have increasing
marginal costs.
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costs. These expectations must be rational: each firm knows which type of firms will
self-select into which international business mode. We first show that (i) an interior
solution exists such that different types will choose different strategies; and (ii) lower-
cost types will choose FDI, whereas higher-cost types will choose exporting (as in the
heterogeneous firm models) as to be confirmed in equilibrium; then we discuss possible
corner solutions.
Let ΠX(c) and ΠFDI(c) denote the expected profits of a firm of type c when it chooses
exporting and FDI, respectively. An interior solution requires that there exists type
δ ∈ [α, β] that is indifferent between exporting and FDI: ΠX(c = δ) = ΠFDI(c = δ).
Consider first foreign firm j that forms expectations about its rival i’s costs in the
domestic market. This rival does not face any trade costs in serving its domestic
market, and hence firm j’s expectation of firm i’s marginal cost of serving market i is
simply the expected value of c :
Ej(cdi ) =
∫ β
α
c
1
β − αdc = (β + α)/2.
Now consider domestic firm i forming expectations on the expected cost of its rival j
in the domestic market. If firm j serves country i by exports, then it will have to bear
a per-unit trade cost t. Given the uniform distribution, firm i believes that firm j will
choose the export mode with probability (β − δ)/(β − α), and the FDI mode with the
complimentary probability, (δ − α)/(β − α). If firm j opts for FDI, then its marginal
cost does not include t. Consequently, firm i’s expectation of firm j’s marginal cost in
market i is equal to
Ei(cfj ) =
∫ δ
α
c
1
β − αdc+
∫ β
δ
(c+ t) 1
β − αdc =
β + α
2 +
t(β − δ)
β − α .
By a similar reasoning, firm i’s expectation of firm j’s marginal cost in country j is
equal to Ei(cdj ) = (β+α)/2, and firm j’s expectation of firm i’s marginal cost in country
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j is equal to Ej(cfi ) = (β + α)/2 + t(β − δ)/(β − α).
We now look at the optimal output decisions of the firms. For this purpose, it will be
convenient to save on notation, and so to introduce:
Definition 1 ∆ = 2A+ (β + α)/2, and M = (β − α).
Each firm maximizes its expected profits, ΠX(c) or ΠFDI(c), with respect to its outputs
when it serves the foreign market by exports or FDI, respectively, taking into account
the rival’s expected costs. From the first-order conditions, we find that the outputs
supplied to country i by the two firms, given their marginal costs, are
qdi =
∆ + 2t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3ci
6 , q
f
j =
∆− t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3cfj
6 ,
where the subscript denotes the location of a firm’s headquarters and the superscript
denotes the target market.12 The relevant cost cfj is (cj + t) if firm j serves country i
by exports, and cj if it undertakes FDI in country i. Similarly, the outputs supplied to
country j by the two firms, given their marginal costs, are
qdj =
∆ + 2t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3cj
6 , q
f
i =
∆− t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3cfi
6 .
In order to focus on the export-FDI trade-off, we assume that all outputs are positive
throughout the paper. Otherwise, some types of firms would not produce at all, and
this would not change our essential results except the exposition and expressions would
be more cumbersome.
Given the optimal outputs in this Bayesian game, we can now compute the expected
profits of the exporting firm, and of the firm undertaking FDI (without fixed costs)
12For example, for firm j, the headquarters is in country j, and market i is the "foreign" market. That
is why we use the symbol qfj in the above equation.
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that has realized a marginal cost of size c:
ΠX =
(
∆− t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3(c+ t)
)2
36 , (1a)
ΠFDI =
(
∆− t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3c
)2
36 − F. (1b)
A firm prefers FDI over exporting if ΠFDI > ΠX . Therefore, given δ, for a firm with
marginal production cost c, FDI is the preferred mode of supply when fixed FDI costs
are sufficiently small such that
F <
t
12
(
2∆− 6c− 2t
(
β − δ
M
)
− 3t
)
.
As can be deduced from eq.(1a), a higher cost c will reduce the expected profits under
the FDI mode by more than those under the export mode: ∂ΠFDI/∂c < ∂ΠX/∂c < 0.
This already confirms that if an interior solution exists, the lower-cost firms opt for
FDI, while the higher-cost firms prefer exporting. Given F , we can determine the
indifferent type c = δ by solving eq.(2):13
F = t12
(
2∆− 6δ − 2t
(
β − δ
M
)
− 3t
)
. (2)
We want to impose stability for our model: reducing fixed costs will, ceteris paribus,
enable a wider range of firm types to undertake FDI. This is guaranteed by:14
Assumption 1 t < 3M .
13As we will show below, for δ to belong to the interval [α, β], fixed costs F must belong to some
interval [FL, FH ].
14Given F > 0 and t > 0, we must find a fixed point, δ, of the mapping Ω : [α, β] → [α, β], where
Ω(δ) ≡ (1/6)[2∆− 3t− 2(t/M)β− 12(F/t) + 2(t/M)δ]. This fixed point changes as F changes. The
graph of the function Ω(δ) shifts down as F increases. This will result in a lower value for the fixed
point iff the slope of the graph is less steep than the 45-degree line: iff (t/3M) < 1. Imposing this
condition amounts to requiring stability. For a more formal discussion of this stability requirement,
see Appendix A.1.
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We can also scrutinize the corner solutions and demonstrate that the co-existence of
exporters and multinationals is not a knife-edge case. All firms will prefer exporting
over FDI when fixed FDI costs are sufficiently large. Let F ′ denote the threshold level
of fixed FDI costs above which even the most efficient firm would prefer exporting to
undertaking FDI. Thus, F ′ is set such that the lowest-cost firm is indifferent between
trade and FDI (c = δ = α):
F ′ = t12(2∆− 6α− 5t).
We call F ′ the multinational-annihilating threshold of fixed costs under non-signaling.
Similarly, we can show that all firms will prefer FDI over exporting when fixed FDI
costs are sufficiently small. Let F ′′ denote the threshold level of fixed FDI costs below
which even the least efficient firm would prefer undertaking FDI to exporting. Thus, F ′′
is set such that the highest-cost firm is indifferent between trade and FDI (c = δ = β):
F ′′ = t12(2∆− 6β − 3t).
We call F ′′ the multinational-facilitating threshold of fixed costs under non-signaling.
By invoking Assumption 1, we can show that
F ′ − F ′′ = t
(3M − t
6
)
> 0.
This shows that there exists a non-degenerate interval of fixed costs, [F ′′, F ′], and for
any F that lies in the interior of this interval, there is a corresponding threshold cost
type, δ(F ), where α < δ(F ) < β, such that firms with marginal cost c < δ(F ) will
choose FDI and firms with marginal cost c > δ(F ) will choose exporting.
What role does firm heterogeneity play for the co-existence of multinational firms and
exporters? We can measure an increase in firm heterogeneity by a mean-preserving
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spread of the probability distribution Φ(c). We find that:
Proposition 1 (Mean-Preserving Spread I) An increase in heterogeneity at the
firm level makes diversity of international business strategies more likely because it
widens the range of fixed costs consistent with sorting. The measure of this widening
is expressed by ∂(F ′ − F ′′)/∂M = t/2 > 0.
Thus, firm heterogeneity is the key for the co-existence of exporters and multinationals.
We conclude that the same ranking of firms in terms of their productivity prevails
in a model of incomplete information: more efficient firms undertake FDI, whereas
less efficient firms self-select into exporting, and if the industry under consideration
is characterized by a large degree of firm heterogeneity, then different international
business strategies are more likely.
3 FDI as a signal of productivity
In the preceding section, we have assumed that FDI does not serve as a cost signal.
In this section, we will explore how firms behave when FDI is an observable activity
which precedes output decisions. For this purpose, we employ a two-stage Bayesian
game in which firms simultaneously decide on the mode of supply, FDI or exporting,
in the first stage, and on their outputs for the two markets in the second stage. We
look for a perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which FDI serves as a binary signal.
After receiving the signal sent by the rival, firms will use the information to update
their beliefs about the rival’s marginal production costs, and in equilibrium this update
must be consistent with the self-selection into exporting and FDI. In the first stage,
however, the foreign market entry decision must be made without knowing the rival’s
decision, and thus each firm will now form expectations not only about the rival’s type
but also about the rival’s international business strategy.
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In Stage 2, each firm will have observed one of four possible outcomes of the decision on
the foreign market entry mode. Let δs denote now the type of the firm that is indifferent
between trade and FDI when firms make their entry mode decisions in Stage 1. We
solve the problem backwards. First, we characterize the Stage 2 equilibrium outputs
of the firms, given their knowledge of what have taken place in Stage 1. There are four
possible observations, which we call Outcomes 1 to 4 and whose details are elaborated
in Appendix A.2.
In Outcome 1, both firms have opted for FDI, and thus they use the mutual FDI signal
to update their beliefs about the range of marginal production costs that the other
firm operates in. Thus, in this case, they both signal that they are lower-cost firms,
and this changes the nature of competition in the product market. If firm i undertakes
FDI, but firm j exports (Outcome 2), then we have an asymmetric outcome. In this
case, firm i signals that its marginal production costs are in the range (α, δs), whereas
firm j signals that its marginal production costs are in the range (δs, β). Firm i’s
marginal cost is regarded as being in the low-cost range, and since firm i has chosen
to be multinational, the rival’s expectation about firm i’s marginal cost is the same
for both markets. In contrast, firm j has signaled that it is operating in the high-cost
range, and since this makes firm j an exporter, it will be expected to suffer a further
disadvantage in firm i’s home market due to trade costs.
The no-FDI signal sent by firm j has two implications for firm i: it learns that (1)
the rival is relatively weak because it is in the high-cost range, and (2) the rival is
even weaker in firm i’s home market, due to trade costs. It goes without saying that
Outcome 2 would be most favorable for firm i. Conversely, Outcome 3 in which firm I
does not undertake FDI, but firm j does, is the mirror image of Outcome 2 and most
favorable for firm j. Outcome 4 occurs when both firms signal that their marginal
production costs are in the high-cost range (δs, β),
We can then derive the expected profit of a firm that has realized a marginal cost of
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size c, conditional on its international business strategy. Whether or not the firm does
undertake FDI, it will always face two different possible actions by the other firm: (1)
with probability (δs − α)/M , the rival firm’s cost is sufficiently low that it chooses the
FDI mode, and (2) with the complementary probability, (β − δs)/M , the rival firm’s
cost is sufficiently high that it prefers exporting.
Appendix A.2 shows that FDI is the preferred mode of supply when fixed FDI costs
are sufficiently small such that
Fs <
M(4∆ + β − 2δs + α) + 4t(4∆ + β − 3δs + 2α− 8t)− 12c(4t+M)
72 .
As for firm behavior across different cost ranges, Appendix A.2 shows that the exporting
firm’s expected total profits decrease by less than the decrease in the multinational’s
expected total profits with an increase in c, confirming that if an interior solution
exists, it will be the lower-cost firms that opt for FDI, whereas the higher-cost firms
will prefer exporting.
We can solve for the indifferent type c = δs:
Fs =
M(4∆ + β − 2δs + α) + 4t(4∆ + β − 3δs + 2α− 8t)− 12δs(4t+M)
72 . (3)
We observe that in the signaling case, stability is guaranteed because dδs/dFs < 0,
irrespective of the size of t. Let us now look at the scope for the co-existence of
multinationals and exporters. All firms prefer trade over FDI when fixed FDI costs
are sufficiently large. Let F ′s denote the threshold level of fixed FDI costs above which
even the most efficient firm would prefer exporting to undertaking FDI. Thus, F ′s is set
such that the lowest-cost firm is indifferent between trade and FDI (c = δs = α):
F ′s =
M(4∆ +M − 12α) + 4t(4∆ +M − 12α− 8t)
72 .
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We call F ′s the multinational-annihilating threshold of fixed costs under signaling.
Similarly, we can show that all firms prefer FDI over exporting when fixed FDI costs
are sufficiently small. Let F ′′s denote the threshold level of fixed FDI costs below which
even the least efficient firm would prefer undertaking FDI to exporting. Thus, F ′′s is
set such that the highest-cost firm is indifferent between trade and FDI (c = δs = β):
F ′′s =
M(4∆− 12β −M) + 8t(2∆− 6β −M − 4t)
72 .
We call F ′′s the multinational-facilitating threshold of fixed costs under signaling.
Clearly,
F ′s − F ′′s =
M(30t+ 7M)
36 > 0.
This shows that in the signaling case, there exists a non-degenerate interval of fixed
costs, [F ′′s , F ′s], and for any Fs that lies in the interior of this interval, there is a cor-
responding threshold cost type, δs(Fs), where α < δs(Fs) < β, such that firms with
marginal cost c < δs(Fs) will choose FDI and firms with marginal cost c > δs(Fs) will
choose exporting. The following result shows that firm heterogeneity plays qualitatively
a similar role as in the non-signaling case.
Proposition 2 (Mean-preserving spread II) An increase in heterogeneity at the
firm level makes diversity of international business strategies more likely in the signaling
case because it widens the range of fixed costs consistent with sorting. The measure of
this widening in the signaling case is expressed by ∂(F ′s−F ′′s )/∂M = (15t+7M)/18 > 0.
Thus, we find that when FDI serves as a signal, the co-existence of exporters and
multinationals remain possible within a range of fixed FDI costs, and this range widens
with an increase in heterogeneity of cost types. In the next section, we will explore the
main differences between the non-signaling and the signaling cases.
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4 The signaling effect of FDI
The objective of this section is to determine how signaling alters the probability of FDI
and the expected industry output. We compare the results of Section 2 (where FDI
cannot be used as a signal) with the results of Section 3 (where FDI serves also as a
signal). Let us start with the comparison of the threshold levels of fixed investment
costs. We observe that
F ′s − F ′ =
M(4∆− 12α + 4t+M)
72 +
t(2∆− 6α− t)
36 > 0, (4a)
F ′′s − F ′′ =
M(4∆− 12β − 8t−M)
72 +
t(2∆− 6β − 7t)
36 > 0, (4b)
(F ′s − F ′′s )− (F ′ − F ′′) =
(7M2 + 6t2 + 12Mt)
36 > 0. (4c)
Eq.(4) shows that the signaling effect of FDI shifts both thresholds up, and leads to
a wider range of fixed investment costs in which we have the co-existence of exporters
and multinationals. Figure 1 illustrates these result, and shows the indifferent types
as a function of fixed costs.
In Figure 1, fixed costs (F ) are on the horizontal axis, and the cost realizations of
firms (c ∈ [α, β]) are on the vertical axis. The indifferent types in the benchmark
case (where FDI cannot be used as a signal) are demonstrated by the fine black line
(δ), below (and to the left of) which (the area shaded in gray) firms opt for FDI, and
above (and to the right of) which (the complimentary area including the area with
horizontal-hatching) firms export. When FDI serves as a signal, the line representing
the indifferent types gets flatter (following from eq.(4c)) and shifts to the thick black
line (δs), above (and to the right of) which firms export, and below (to the left of)
which (the area shaded in gray plus the area with horizontal-hatching) firms opt for
FDI. The area with horizontal-hatching (between the two downward-sloping lines δ
and δs) clearly shows the strategic (signaling) effect of FDI incentivizing some (less
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Figure 1: Indifferent types with and without signaling.
efficient) firms to switch their entry decision from exports to FDI. As for the corner
solutions, below F ′′s (in the signaling case) and F ′′ (in the benchmark case), all types
opt for FDI; above F ′s (in the signaling case) and F ′ (in the benchmark case), all types
prefer exporting, which leads to the horizontal lines in Figure 1. As is clear from
Figure 1, and from the comparison of the threshold levels of fixed investment costs,
given by eq.(4), the signaling effect of FDI makes FDI more likely, both in terms of the
levels of fixed cost thresholds, and in terms of the size of the range of fixed investment
costs. Furthermore, the change in the indifferent type with the critical fixed FDI
costs is smaller in absolute terms in the case of signaling, as can easily be seen from
differentiating and comparing eq.(2) and eq.(3).
We summarize these findings in:
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Proposition 3 (Comparing the threshold fixed costs) (i) The probability of FDI
is larger if FDI can serve as a signal. (ii) With or without signaling, an increase in
firm heterogeneity increases the range of fixed costs in which different types will choose
different international business strategies, however the quantitative effect of an increase
in firm heterogeneity is more pronounced in the signaling case.
Proof. The first part follows immediately from eq.(4a) and from Figure 1, whereas
the second part follows from ∂[(F ′s − F ′′s )− (F ′ − F ′′)]/∂M = (6t+ 7M)/18 > 0.
Since the indifferent type and the critical fixed FDI costs are inversely related, a direct
implication of Proposition 3 (and Figure 1) is that more firms undertake FDI if FDI
can serve as a signal because δs ≥ δ for any given fixed FDI costs (see Figure 1). The
clear result in terms of the FDI probability already indicates that consumers are likely
to benefit from the signaling effect of FDI. The details of the computation of expected
outputs are, however, cumbersome and tedious, in particular for the case where FDI
can serve as a signal of productivity (we must go through all four possible cases).15
If FDI cannot be used as a signal of productivity, the computation of expected outputs
is easier because the expected output of a firm in the local market does not depend
on its international business strategy. The details of the computations are included
in Appendix A.3, where E[Qsk] (respectively, E[Qk]) denotes the expected aggregate
supply to market k if FDI can (cannot) be a cost signal. As for the difference, we find
E[Qsk]− E[Qk] =
2∆− 3(β + α)− 2t(β−δs)M
6
−
2∆− 3(β + α)− 2t(β−δ)M
6

= t(δs − δ)3M ≥ 0, as δs ≥ δ, for any given F (see Figure 1). (5)
This immediately leads to:
15These cases are such that both firms undertake FDI or both firms export, or the two asymmetric
cases (i.e., one firm undertakes FDI, whereas the other firm exports).
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Proposition 4 Expected aggregate supply to each market is larger if FDI can serve as
a signal of productivity.
Since the model is symmetric, this result applies also to the change in the expected
world-wide (total) outputs of the firms. We are able to decompose the output changes
into the changes in the two markets that the firms operate in. We find that the
signaling effect of FDI makes each firm achieve a bigger market share in the foreign
market (compared to the non-signaling case).
Proposition 5 The opportunity to use FDI as a signal of productivity reduces both
firms’ expected sales in their respective home markets by t(δs − δ)/3M , but increases
their expected sales in the foreign markets by 2t(δs − δ)/3M .
Proposition 5 demonstrates the signaling effects of FDI. The FDI probability increases
because not undertaking FDI is a bad signal, resulting not only in a reduced market
share in the foreign market due to trade costs, but also in both the domestic and
the foreign market due to signaling high marginal costs. Thus, firms are more willing
to undertake FDI whenever FDI is a signal of productivity. A higher probability of
FDI means that competition becomes more intense in both countries, and therefore
firms are able to enlarge their market shares abroad, while accommodating foreign
competition by reducing their market shares in their respective domestic markets. Can
we say anything about the welfare effects of FDI when FDI is a signal of productivity?
Consumers will always benefit from FDI as it will reduce the variable production costs.
However, it is well known from duopoly models without firm heterogeneity that an FDI
option can lead to a prisoners’ dilemma for both firms: while each firm’s total profits
(from the two markets) would be larger if both firms were to choose exporting as the
mode of supplying the foreign market, each firm has a unilateral incentive to become
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multinational. The profit decrease can even be larger than the consumer gain.16 We
cannot rule out that similar effects could be at work in our setup.
5 Concluding remarks
Our paper has shown that the capacity to signal productivity via FDI increases the
incentive to undertake FDI. How do our results match empirical regularities? While we
cannot offer direct empirical evidence on the signaling effect of FDI, there is indirect
evidence supporting our hypothesis. For example, Helpman et al. (2004) find that the
probability of FDI depends positively on both the level of R&D activities and a measure
of industry heterogeneity. Similarly, Yeaple (2009) shows that the propensity of U.S.
parent firms to invest in any given foreign market increases with parent firm size and
with total factor productivity (TFP). Head and Ries (2003) and Tomiura (2007) report
similar findings for Japanese manufacturing firms.17 Raff et al. (2012) also find that
the probability of Japanese FDI depends positively on both the R&D intensity and
TFP. It is evident that both R&D activities and TFP support FDI activities, though
they do not seem to measure the same thing. In fact, the correlation between TFP and
R&D is only 0.217 in Raff et al. (2012), and the highest correlation is with firm size at
a level of 0.312. By the same token, Head and Ries (2003), looking at publicly listed
Japanese firms, show that firm size measures are not highly correlated with productivity
measures (ranging from 0.05 to 0.27). It is, hence, not just a productivity draw from
an exogenous distribution that determines firms’ globalization, but also firms’ R&D
efforts.
16This result depends crucially on the assumption that market entry is not endogenous. With endoge-
nous entry, the welfare effects of FDI are unambiguously positive (De Santis and Stähler, 2004).
17While controlling for productivity, for factor intensity, or for firm size, there is significant firm het-
erogeneity, which increases the probability of an FDI activity. Castellani and Giovannetti (2010),
looking at Italian manufacturing firms, show that TFP premia for multinationals remain signifi-
cant even after controlling for various firm characteristics, including R&D intensity, and that firm
heterogeneity seems to be not only in the intercept, but also in the slopes of the production function.
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From this perspective, R&D plays only one of its potential roles in our model: it gener-
ates uncertainty about a firm’s marginal cost in the minds of its rivals, and this makes
the firm more likely to opt for FDI as a signal, especially if the R&D outcome is posi-
tive. Thus, while FDI is associated with high TFP (as in the standard heterogeneous
firm literature) with or without R&D, a firm is more likely to choose FDI for a given
TFP in the presence of R&D than in its absence. As the focus of our attention was the
role of cost signaling via FDI, we have not endogenized the R&D level as in the trade
model of Long et al. (2011). Endogenizing R&D would require to discuss whether the
range of possible cost realizations monotonically increases with a firm’s R&D level. If
it does, we would expect not only more FDI due to the cost signaling effect but also
more R&D.
Another interesting extension of our paper could be to include some other possible
avenues by which R&D might promote FDI, irrespective of TFP. For example, R&D
may also improve the portability of a firm’s technology, or may make a firm’s product
more appealing to foreign customer, especially through a quality upgrade or product
differentiation). Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore the potential of cost
signaling for different types of FDI where the selected FDI mode may serve as a signal
as well. Our model is confined to greenfield FDI, but other FDI modes, for example
forming a joint venture with a local partner or acquiring an existing firm may have
different implications. We do not expect that our results will change as we know
that also the FDI mode follows a productivity pattern: more productive firms prefer
a greenfield investment over an acquisition and whole ownership over a joint venture
(Raff et al., 2012). Therefore, the cost signaling effect should extend straightforwardly.
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Appendix
A.1 Stability
In the main text, we mentioned that Assumption 1 ensures stability. This argument
can be made more formal. Since the two markets are segmented, we can focus on one
market, say market i.
Suppose that firm i guesses that firm j has the following decision rule concerning its
supply to market i.
Using a cost threshold δ ∈ [α, β],
(i) if cj < δ, then firm j undertakes FDI to supply the following quantity to market i:
qfj (cj|cj < δ) =
∆− t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3cj
6 ;
(ii) if cj > δ, then firm j exports the following quantity to market i:
qfj (cj|cj > δ) =
∆− t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3(cj + t)
6 .
Given δe that denotes the value of the cost threshold firm i has guessed, firm i’s
expectation of foreign supply is, then,
Ei(qfj ) =
∆− t
(
β−δe
M
)
− 3cj
6 −
3
6t× Pr [cj > δ
e]
=
∆− t
(
β−δe
M
)
− 3cj
6 −
3
6t
(
β − δe
M
)
= 16
[
2A− 4t
(
β − δe
M
)
− (β + α)
]
Using this expectation, firm i, knowing its cost ci, will choose quantity qdi to maximize
its expected profit in the domestic market such that
max
qdi
[
A− Ei(qfj )− qdi − ci
]
qdi ,
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which yields the first order condition
qdi =
1
2
[
A− Ei(qfj )− ci
]
=
∆ + 2t
(
β−δe
M
)
− 3ci
6 .
Given this output strategy of firm i, which has cost ci for market i, firm j, which does
not know the value of ci, calculates the expected value of firm i’s supply, such that
Ej(qdi ) =
∆ + 2t
(
β−δe
M
)
− 3
(
β+α
2
)
6 .
Firm j must, then, decide how much to supply to market i if it were to export, and
how much to supply if it were to undertake FDI. Under the exporting mode, its profit
is ΠX(cj) = [qf(X)j (cj)]2, and under the FDI mode, it is ΠFDI(cj) = [q
f(FDI)
j (cj)]2 − F ,
where qf(X)j (cj) and q
f(FDI)
j (cj) are firm j’s supply to market i (conditional on its cost
type cj) under the exporting and the FDI mode, respectively, such that
q
f(X)
j (cj) =
∆− t
(
β−δe
M
)
− 3(cj + t)
6 , q
f(FDI)
j (cj) =
∆− t
(
β−δe
M
)
− 3cj
6 .
Clearly, ΠFDI(cj) > ΠX(cj) iff F < (2∆− 6cj − 2t(β − δe)/M − 3t) t/12. The value of
cj that satisfies the equation F = (2∆− 6cj − 2t(β − δe)/M − 3t) t/12, clearly, yields
the optimal actual threshold to be used by firm j, denoted δa, such that
δa = 16
[
2∆− 2t
(
β − δe
M
)
− 3t− 12F
t
]
≡ f(δe). (A.1)
Graphically, δa as a function of δe is an upward-sloping line with slope 2t/M . The
intersection of this line and the 45-degree line determines the rational expectation
equilibrium δ∗:
δ∗ =
(
2∆− 2tβ
M
− 3t− 12F
t
)/(
6− 2t
M
)
.
We can think of an adjustment process that takes place out of equilibrium. Suppose
at time τ , we have δa(τ) > δe(τ). In such a situation, we expect that δe would be
adjusted upwards. Thus we postulate the following adjustment process, with γ > 0,
.
δe(τ) = γ [δa(τ)− δe(τ)] = γ6
[
2∆− 2t
(
β
M
)
− 3t− 12F
t
−
(
6− 2t
M
)
δe(τ)
]
.
The solution of this linear differential equation converges to the steady state δ∗ if and
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only if 6 > 2t/M (i.e., iff Assumption 1 is satisfied).
Using the stability condition 6 > 2t/M , we find that an increase in F will decrease δ∗:
higher fixed FDI costs imply smaller ranges of firm types that prefer undertaking FDI
to exporting.
Notice that δ∗ = α iff
F = t (2∆− 6α− 5t)12 ≡ F
′,
and δ∗ = β iff
F = t (2∆− 6β − 3t)12 ≡ F
′′
,
where F ′ > F ′′ under Assumption 1.
Also notice that for any F ∈ [F ′′, F ′], the function f(.) defined by eq.(A.1) maps [α, β]
into [α, β], and is a contraction mapping.
A.2 Outputs and expected profits in case of signaling
Outcome 1: Both firms have chosen FDI.
Conditional on this information, the expected marginal costs are given by
Ei(cfj ) = Ei(cdj ) = Ej(c
f
i ) = Ej(cdi ) =
∫ δs
α
c
dc
δs − α =
δs + α
2 .
Accordingly, the quantities firms supply to market i are given by
qdi =
∆−
(
β−δs
2
)
− 3ci
6 , q
f
j =
∆−
(
β−δs
2
)
− 3cj
6 ,
where the subscripts and superscripts have the same meaning as in the preceding
section. Due to symmetry, supplies to market j are given by
qfi =
∆−
(
β−δs
2
)
− 3ci
6 , q
d
j =
∆−
(
β−δs
2
)
− 3cj
6 .
Outcome 2: Firm i has undertaken FDI, and firm j has chosen to be an exporter.
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Conditional on this information, the expected marginal costs are given by
Ej(cdi ) = Ej(c
f
i ) =
∫ δs
α
c
dc
δs − α =
δs + α
2 ,
Ei(cdj ) =
∫ β
δs
c
dc
β − δs =
β + δs
2 ,
Ei(cfj ) =
∫ β
δs
(c+ t) dc
β − δs =
β + δs
2 + t.
In this case, the quantities firms supply to market i are given by
qdi =
∆ +
(
β−δs
2
)
+ (δs − α) + 2t− 3ci
6 , q
f
j =
∆−
(
δs−α
2
)
− (β − δs)− 4t− 3cj
6 ,
and the quantities they supply to market j are given by
qfi =
∆ +
(
β−δs
2
)
+ (δs − α)− 3ci
6 , q
d
j =
∆−
(
δs−α
2
)
− (β − δs)− 3cj
6 .
Outcome 3: Firm j has undertaken FDI, and firm i has chosen to be an exporter.
This outcome is a mirror image of Outcome 3, so we do not report the equations here.
Outcome 4: Both firms have decided against FDI.
Conditional on this information, the expected marginal costs are given by
Ei(cdj ) = Ej(cdi ) =
∫ β
δs
c
dc
β − δs =
β + δs
2 ,
Ei(cfj ) = Ej(c
f
i ) =
∫ β
δs
(c+ t) dc
β − δs =
β + δs
2 + t.
Then their supplies of goods for market i are given by
qdi =
∆ +
(
δs−α
2
)
+ 2t− 3ci
6 , q
f
j =
∆ +
(
δs−α
2
)
− 4t− 3cj
6 .
Similarly, for market j, their supplies are given by
qfi =
∆ +
(
δs−α
2
)
− 4t− 3ci
6 , q
d
j =
∆ +
(
δs−α
2
)
+ 2t− 3cj
6 .
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Given the production levels above, we can compute firm i’s expected total profits
(without R&D costs) if it chooses the exporting mode, denoted by ΠX :
ΠX =
(
δs − α
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[firm j → FDI]

(
∆ +
(
δs−α
2
)
−M − 3c
)2
36︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from country i
+
(
∆ +
(
δs−α
2
)
−M − 4t− 3c
)2
36︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from country j

+
(
β − δs
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[firm j → X]

(
∆ +
(
δs−α
2
)
+ 2t− 3c
)2
36︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from country i
+
(
∆ +
(
δs−α
2
)
− 4t− 3c
)2
36︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from country j
 .(A.2)
Similarly, we can compute firm i’s expected total profits (without R&D costs) if its
mode of supply in country j is FDI, denoted by ΠFDI :
ΠFDI =
(
β − δs
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[firm j → X]

(
∆−
(
β−δs
2
)
+M + 2t− 3c
)2
36︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from country i
+
(
∆−
(
β−δs
2
)
+M − 3c
)2
36︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from country j

+
(
δs − α
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[firm j → FDI]

(
∆−
(
β−δs
2
)
− 3c
)2
36︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from country i
+
(
∆−
(
β−δs
2
)
− 3c
)2
36︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits from country j
− Fs .(A.3)
In eq.(A.3), Fs denotes fixed FDI costs in the case FDI serves as a signal of productivity.
Firm i prefers FDI over exporting if ΠFDI > ΠX , leading to (3). Furtermore, we
observe from eq.(A.2) and eq.(A.3) that, with an increase in c, the exporting firm’s
expected total profits decrease by less than the decrease in the multinational’s expected
total profits: ∂ΠFDI/∂c < ∂ΠX/∂c < 0.
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A.3 Expected aggregate outputs
Expected aggregate outputs in country k = {i, j} if FDI serves as a cost signal, denoted
E[Qsk], are given by
(
δs − α
M
)(
β − δs
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[firm i→ FDI, firm j → X]

∫ δs
α
∆− (β−δs)2 +M + 2t− 3c
6
 dc
δs − α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic (firm i’s) production
+
∫ β
δs
∆ + (δs−α)2 −M − 4t− 3c
6
 dc
β − δs︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreign (firm j’s) production

+
(
β − δs
M
)(
δs − α
M
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[firm i→ X, firm j → FDI]

∫ β
δs
∆ + (δs−α)2 −M − 3c
6
 dc
β − δs︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic (firm i’s) production
+
∫ δs
α
∆− (β−δs)2 +M − 3c
6
 dc
δs − α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreign (firm j’s) production
+
(
β − δs
M
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[firm i, j → X]
∫ β
δs
∆ + (δs−α)2 + 2t− 3c
6
 dc
β − δs︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic (firm i’s) production
+
∫ β
δs
∆ + (δs−α)2 − 4t− 3c
6
 dc
β − δs︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreign (firm j’s) production

+
(
δs − α
M
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[firm i, j → FDI]
 2
∫ δs
α
∆− (β−δs)2 − 3c
6
 dc
δs − α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic (firm i’s) and foreign (firm j’s) production
 ,
where the expression Pr[firm i → S ∈ {FDI, X}, firm j → S ∈ {FDI, X}] stands
for the probability that one of the four outcomes discussed in Section 3 materializes
in equilibrium which is determined by firms i’s and firm j’s self-selection into one of
the two modes of foreign market entry (FDI or exporting). Note that the exporting
strategy, here, is denoted by X.
Expected aggregate outputs in country k = {i, j} if FDI cannot be a cost signal,
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denoted E[Qk], are given by
∫ δ
α
∆− t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3c
6
 dc
M
+
∫ β
δ
∆− t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3(c+ t)
6
 dc
M︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreign (firm j’s) production
+
∫ β
α
∆ + 2t
(
β−δ
M
)
− 3c
6
 dc
M︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic (firm i’s) production
.
Subtracting this expression from the preceding one leads to eq.(5).
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